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{t its sittings of ?? January 1982 and 13 0ctober 19EZ respectiveLy the
European ParIiament referred the motions for resolutions tabled by
Itlr de [a ltlaLEne (Doc. 1-954181) and ttlr CoLtins and others (Doc. 1-699tB?-),
pursuant to Ru[e 47 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Externbt
Economic ReIations as the committee responsibLe.
At its meeting of 18 0ctober 1982 the committee decided to draw up a report
on EEC-USA trade retations in the steeL sector and appointed ttr Spencer
rapporteur.
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of ?? September
and 2 December 19E2, 27 January, ?3 June, zE September, 19 October and
24 November 1983 and 15 January, ?2 February and 29 February 1994. At the
last meeting it unanimousLy adopted the notion for a resolution as a rhoLe.
The fotLoring took part in the vote: sir Fred catherwood, chairman;
llr van Aerssen, vice-chairmani [tlr Spencer, rapporteurl trlrs Badue[-G[orioso,
ltlr BLumenfe[d, ttiss Hooper, ilr Jonker, [rlr Pesmazogtou, trlr Radoux, ilr Rieger,
Mr Rivierez and lrlr SeeLer.
The report yas- tabLed on 7 llarch.
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report wiLt be indicated in the
draft agenda for the part-session at vhich it uitt be debated.
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AThe Committee on External Economic Retations hereby submits to thc turopean
ParIiatent the fo[loring motion for a resotution yith explanatory statenent:
I'IOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on EEC-USA trade relations in the steet sector
The European ParIiament,
having regard to the motions for resotutions tabted by ilr de ta ilatene and
others on a European riposte to the complaint made by American stee[ corn-
panies (Doc. 1-9541E1) and lir Cottins and others on the situation in the
steet industry (Doc. 1-699182),
having regard to the report of the Committee on Externa[ Economic Re[ations
(Doc. 1-1543183),
having regard to the report of the Conrnittee on External Economic relations
on the economic and trade retations betreen the EEC and the USA (Doc. ),
having regard to the report of the Committee on ExternaL Economic Relations on
the detineation and further devetopment of GATT and of the free trade principles
underLying the GATT system and possibte consequences for the EEC and the GATT
(Doc. 1-493183>,
having regard to its resotution on combating the crisis in the European steet
1
i ndust ry ' ,
having regard to its resolution cLosing the procedure for consuttation of the
European Parliament on the proposal from the Commission of the EC to the
CounciL for a regutation on the strengthening of the common commerciaL poLicy
urith regard in particuLar to protection against unfair conmerciaL practicesz,
(a) Notes that the negotiation of 19E2 took ptace against a background of
dramatic over-capacity in vortd steet produ.ction in yhich the arrivaL of
ner producers coincided with a dectine in the demand for steel products.
(b) Notes the traditiona[ share of the US market for steet taken by European
steeL manufacturers and the tendency for crises in US-EC steet trade to
recur despite previous attempts at ending trade frictions.
c 161 of 20.6.1983 p.14?-148
ptenary of ?9.6.'1983
1 
o,l
2e,
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(c) Notes the tradition of state heLp and protectionism for the US steeL
industry in the first haLf of this century; drars attention to the irnpact
on the competitiveness of the US stee[ industry of the system of inflation-
proofed uage. jncreases since ll.i+, which has Led uage costs to rise welL
ahead of European and Japanese leveLs. Notes the link betreen high energy
costs and interest rates and the reduction in investment which has Led some
companies to diversify their activities alay from steet. i
(d) Notes the recurrent link betyeen a high leveL of the US doLtar and the re-
emergence of protectionist pressures by the US steeL industry; notes the
"breakdown" of the trigger price mechanism at a time when European imports
into'the US trere rising.
(e) Recognises the negotiating probLems faced by the European Commission when
faced by the compLexity of US institutions and the semi-judiciaI nature of
US decision-making. Further recognises that such procedures pIace pressures
above and beyond those specified under GATT rutes.
1. CongratuIates the European Commission on the reLativety successfuL concLusion
of difficu[t negotiations, and stresses the importance of maintaining a com-
prehensive Community position in any future negotiations.
?. conctudes that the probLems of the US steeL industry cannot be
timited degree of penetration achieved by European producers,
tine with traditionat trade flows.
3. Accepts that the IeveI of state subsidies is a retevant factor
of internationaL trade negotiations and catts for further work
on the question of subsidies and the.ir definition.
btamed on the
which is in
in the conduct
at the GATT
4. Stresses'its support for the restructuring of the European steeL industry
such that it can compete w.ithout subsjdies.
5. Maintains its voluntary restraint agreements, designed to continue third
country imports at traditionaI Levets, pending a stabitisation of the worLd
market in steeL.
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6. Determines to continue its consideration of so-catled 'commerciaI defence'
measures on both sides of the Attantic, mindfuL of its commitment to free
trade'in industriaL goods, and betieving that European industry shouLd not
be p[aced at a disadvantage by the nationa[ Lars and practices of our major
trading Partners.
7. protests at the unnecessary and protectionist measures of the US Administration
directed against exports of speciaI steets from the Community'
- Approves of the decision to respond to this American action entirety
vithin the frameuork of GATT.
- Recognizes that the community tried hard to reach an agreement on compen-
sation that wouLd have rendered retaIiatory measures unnecessary.
- Notes that US consumption and production of speciat steeLs in the third
quarter of 19E5 had returned to traditional Leve[s.
- Endorses the package of retaLiatory measures announced by the community
on 14 JanuarY '1984-
8. Instructs its President to forward this resol'ution to the commission and
Councit of the European Communities'
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B
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
!NIB9qUgUAN
1. Negotiations betreen the E.C. and the tJ.S. in the steet sector have
been atmost continuous tor the last tr.o years. They have generated much
argument and much distrust. This Report seeks to document uhat happened,
and to assess why it happened, against the background of prob[ems facing
the rJ.S. Steel. lndustry. lt further seeks to drar rider conctusions about
trade negotiations uith America and riththe Reagan Administration in
particutar.
IEE-U.9._!IEEt-INqUSIB!
?. ALthough the rJ.S. steeI industry proudty maintains that the U.S. is
the onLy targe "truly open narket" in the rortd, there is a Long
tradition of intimate invoIvement uith the Federat authorities. The
industry greu up behind tarift barriers against European Competition in
the 19th century. lt benefitted from Nationat Recovery Act he[p in the
Depression, and trom state hetp during and after t{or[d tlar lI. Every
President since the rar has had to tace some kind of steet crisis.
Strikes damaged the industry in 1946, during the Korean bJar and again
in 1959. The Kennedy Administration intervened to inf[uence both uages
and prices in nhat Has regarded as an industriatty key industry-
3. tJnti [ 1958 the rJnited States uas a net exporter of stee[. Houever,
the rebuitding of the Japanese and European steel industries began to
cha(Lenge for a share of the U:S. market as from the 1959 steet strike,
uhen.steet users diversified their sources of supp[y. lndeed, a pattern
of rising imports became associated nith each neu Hage negotiation. ln
an attempt to avoid the disruption and [ack of contidence attaching to
these negotiations, the ExperimentaL Negotiating Agreement (E.N.A.)
Has entered into in 1974. This contained a cost of Iiving provision
that has substantiaLty raised the cost of tabour. Steetuorkersr uages
rose by $4.42 per hour in the period t4ay 1974 - February 1982, as
against average tJ.S. rages rises of $2.16 per hour.
4. ALthough onty tno "greenfietd" mitts have been compteted in the
rJ.S. since 1950, the industry has undertaken a substantiaI investment
programme. This programme has not, houever, matched the co-ordinated
state-sponsored poLicies of its major competitors, and the Last tifteen
years have seen a COnStant Stream Ot COmpLaints about "imported" and
"dumped" steet. In [ater years the t5o vords have come to be used
I1.
-8 PE E6.030 ttin.
tinterchangeabty. 1t is nor argued by some Americans
steeIs have discouraged any major further investment
production, and that as a resutt the industry is nor
decI ining compet i t iveness.
that imported
in steeI
faced rith
5. Voluntary Restraint Agreements (V.R.A.rs) uere negotiated Hith
Europe and Japan in 196E on a tonnage basis. The importers naturatty,
therefore, traded up anci concentrated their etforts on higher-priced
stcets uhich caused considerabte problems for the speciaLty steets
sector untit it ron an anti-dumping case in 1975. The carbon steet
industry sutfered trom atL the probtems of recession during the 1970's,
demand fett, uhi[e intl,ation rose, as did energy prices. In 19?7r
after the OECD steeI consensus, the Carter Adninistration responded to
a rise in imports by imposing the Trigger Price l,lechanism (T.P.!1.),
nhich egtabLished minimum prices for imported stee[, belou nhich
dumping uoutd be presumed. rJ.S. steeI conpanies thereupon rithdrer
their dumping suits undcr the 1974 Trade Reform Act. The T-P.!|.
ras Iinked to costs of Japanese production and did not Hoik in practice
as had been intended. The mechanisns rene attered in 19E0, transferring
responsibitity to the Departmcnt of Connncrce and buil.ding in an anti-
suPgc mechanism.
The industry has consistentLy arobiIised najor Lobbying canpaigns
to arouse American pubtic opinion. The Steel Caucus on Capitot Hitt
is vocaI in support of inport restrictions. ln addition, the industry
has calted, uith some success, for tax Changes to encourage capital
investment in the industry by atLoning faster depreciation (19E1 Tax Act).
The industry has atso pushed tor a retaxation of environmental pot[ution
standards that it regards as unduty onerous. The rigours of Anti-Trust
poLicy have to some extcnt becn rel,ieved and some nergers have taken ptace.
6. It is rorth quoting rin cxtensol frror.Dryid ilcLsonlc iapcr for';the House
of Representatives' Conmittee on Energy and Commerce, on one particutar
point. He says:- "lt is arguabLe that the government pol'icy uhich has
nrost direct[y been responsibLe for the decIine in the domestic steeI
industry, at [east in recent years, has been high interest rates.
(they) are rival,l.ed onLy by energy shocks as a source of
disruption of nationaI and internationat aartcts- Throughout the
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19?O's, interest rates increased retenttessLy. This has made it
virtua[.y impossibLe tor profit-maximising firms to commit
themseIves to tong-term capitaL spending projects". lt is this
factor rhich has ted u.S. firms to buy oiI companies and otherurise
diversify, rather than to re-invest in their industry"'
?. The onty "European styte" input of Government funds came in
'19?7 vith the commitment of $ 500 mitLion of Economic Deve[opment
Administration tunds (E.D.A.). This proved contentious, Ied to
prob[ems betueen firms and is being uound doun by the Reagan
Administration. They have aIso terminated the Trade Adjustment Act
under uhich President Carter sought to ease the impact of "impOrt-
reIated" unemployment. This granted SupptenentaI unemptoynent
payments and job re-training. rJnemployment among steetuorkers
causes particutar diStress as they are geographicaIty concentrated
in individuat steeL tonns and the fatI in property vatues
consequent on closure makes re-tocation ditticutt. The tJ.S.
SteelHorker has traditionatLy been part of an industriat eIite,
providing a chance for uprard sociaL mobiLity for those L,ith timited
torma[ education. Their decLine can be presented as damaging to
Americars image of herseLt. Against this comptex background,
American pubLic opinion entered 1981 rith a firnr and sinple
conviction that the stee[ industry ras in troub[e because of foreign
dumping. The events of 19E2 intensified that perception-
A-qHB9U9t99!.9E.IHE.qIBEgT-SIEEt-q!lEUIE
8. 0n 12 January 198? the seven [argest American steeL firms
fited anti-dumping suits nith the lnternationa[ Trade Commission
(1TC) against producers in Betgium, france, itaty, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, the united Kingdom, the FederaI RepubIic of Germany,
Spain, south Africa, Brazit and Romania. The tJS SteeI Corporation
atone presented 400 boxes of evidence to the authorities' A totat
ol 9? suits uere brought affecting up to E4I of Community exports
to the rJS. 0n E and 9 February 19E2 Commissioners Haferkamp
and Davignon had tried uith Littte success to solve the probtem'
0n 19 February 19E2 the Anerican lnternational Trade commission
rejected 56 of the 92 compLaints as unfounded, but decided in the
remaining 56 cases to continue investigations into possib[e
infringements invotving unfair trade practices on the part of
foreign producers.
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0n 19 ttlarch 1962 the Commission todged a comptaint rith the OECD
and contended that the actions of the American steel producers had
consicterabty disrupted traditionaI trade fl,ons and that a situation
simiter to that prevaiting before the 0ECD agreement of 197? again
existed and ras i.orsening as a resutt of other US measures in the
frameuork of GATT in retation to speciaI steets.
9. 0n 11 Juty 19EZ the Commission's hopes of reaching a negotiated
setttement rere shattered fotIoring the introduction of temporary
American countervail.ing duties on imported steeI products. At its
meeting of ?? June 19E2 the CounciI protested vigorousty against the
American measures and aIso pointect to the radicat restructuring
measures and reduction of capacity carried out by the Community in some
areas in recent years. It atso emphasized that atL subsidies granted
to the steel industry rere subject to approvat. by the Conmission and
uere to be phased out by 19E5.
Atthough the rJSA took no account of the Community's etforts, the
CounciI and the Commission continued their attempts over the next few
months to reach a negotiateO setttement. 0n E August 1982 an agreement
uas conc[uded betueen the American Department of Commerce and the
Commission rrhereby Community exports rere not to exceed 5.7561 of the
American steeI market. ln return, the various suits brought by
American steeI producers Here to be suspencteci.
The agreement uas not accepted by the American steet producers in
this form. 0n 12 0ctober 1982 the Commission otfered the Americans
further concessions. ln addition to the agrement on the various types
of steeI concerned, it atso offered to exteno the restrictions to six
types of steet attoys and sheet piLing steel..
10. 0n top of the proceedings rhich had been initiated, the conftict
rras intensified further rhen the lnternationaI Trade Commission ruted
on 15 0ctober 1982 that imports of five different types of steet from
six Community countries uere danaging the American industry, thus
paving the tray for speciaI duties to be introduced. These measures
., Lrere avoideo virtuaLLy at the tast monent as a resuLt of a neu agreement.
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lV. UE-EQlg!-tEEt!9E!E!i-9!-gEEIA!!-!IEEt-eE99ugI!
The agreement of 21 0ctober 19E? contains the fottoring provisions:
1. The agreement concerning the ten ECSC product categories 'is
to run from 1 November 1982 to 51 December 19E5;
?. EEC exports to the USA are to be subject to voluntary
restraint on the basis of estimated tJS domestic consumption.
The share of the rJS market quota attocateo to the ten
product categories is as toItors;
Esedsg!-9reuP
Hot-rolted sheets and striP steeI
Cotd-ro[ [ed sheets
Quarto sheets
Beams (construction steet)
Hot-rotted nerchant bars
SteeI a[loys
Tin pIate
bJ i re rods
Coated steeI
Sheet piLing steeI
!bere-!I).
6.E1
5.11
5 .36
9.91
2.38
8.90
?.?o
4.?9
3.2?
21 .85
3.
4.
The agreement inc[udes a c[ause uhich provides for consu[taton it
Community exports to the rJSA of types of steel not covered by the
agreenent increase significantLy and a deftection of trade is
suspected. (If trade fLous are distorted in this ray, both sides
must take the necessary remediaL measures Hithin 60 days).
In a separate exchange of letters the Community's average exports
of stee[ pipes for 1979 to 19E1 (5.9I of the market) rere set as
a ceiLing for the duration of the agreement. These tetters atso
inctude a consultation c[ause and meaSures Simitar to those
outIined in ParagraPh 3.
IJORKI,NG THE AGREEIIENT
11. After months of deadl.ines and uncertainty the signature of the
Agreement uas greeted uith reLief and niLd diptomatic satisfaction
by both sides. The Agreement provided for quarterty consultation
across the Attantic on this particutar proiect in nanaged trade'
v.
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VI.
AdministrationotanysuchagreementiscompIex.ProbIems
concerning individuaL invoices, of exact timing, of detaited exchanges
betueen categories have atL arisen. ln the pursuit of the goal of
,fair trader the EC has enquired about third country 900ds entering the
U.S.lthasgonedeepintothemethodol.ogyempl.oyedbyDataResources
1nc. (DR1) to produce their torecasts tor the rJ's' market, without
uhich the Agreement can have no meaning'
l3.Houever,theon[yl.ikeLihoodofmajordisturbancehascomefrom
theB.S.c.-tJ.S.SteeLproposal'toshipsemi-finishedproductsfrom
Ravenscraig in ScotLand. No sooner uas the idea suggested than other
Countries such as Brazit uere mooting simiLar p[ans' The potentiaI
changes in the structure of the tJ.s. industry, had this become nidespread'
rdere ctearl,y unsettLing to the tJ.S. adninistration' They thus dectared
such schemes to'run counter to the objectives of the Agreement and
tikety to threaten its viabiLityr '
0n the who[e, houever, the Agreement has uorked smooth[y'
:gEEg!AtI!:-sIgEts
14.TherJ.S..SpeciattySteeLsIindustryhassharedmanyottheHoeSof
thetJ.S.steel.industryatl.arge.lthassufferedtromtherecession
and from the strength of the tJ.S. do[Lar. Arguments about the extent
ofimportSurgescontinue,butonehlayoranothertherJ.S.industryhas
been protected a[most nithout interruption since 1969' ln 1980' however'
the newLy-eLected President Reagan denied the industry further reLief'
UnderrJ.S.tarnoneusection20lcasecou[dbebroughtforaturther
tHo Years.
A Section 501 case aLIe9ing unfair subsidies rias theretore Iaunched
bytheU.S.TradeRepresentative(TJSTR)inDecember19E1.TheE.C.,
AustriaandSrredenHereaccusedofsubsidisingtheirindustries
untairty. ln November 1982 the President instructecj the 1'T'C' to
determine tuhether increased imports llere a substantiat cause 
of serious
inluryt- 0n 5 May 19E3 the l'T'c' so determined'
15. Nothing better i LLustrates the semi-judiciat' semi-poIiticaI nature
of tl.s. trade practices than the rords used by tJ's' oiptomets to defend
these actions:
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"Llnder our [au, the President had 60 days in which to review the l.T.C.
determination and decide rhether to grant retief as recommended by
the l.T.C., other reIiet, or some other action in ptace of reLief.
t{any observers beLieved that it the President did not provide
meaningfut rel.ief, after having received the I.T.C. report, Congress
nouId have tegl.istated import quotas. The statute provides that
once the l.T.C. has made an injury determination and recommended reLiet,
the President "shatt" (i.e. must), provide retief "un[ess he determines
that provision of such retief is not in the nationaI economic interest
of the r.lnited States ." In that case he must advise the Congress
,,. 
. . uhat other steps he is taking, beyond adjustment assistance
programmes immecjiateLy avai Iabte to hel'p the industry to overcome
serious injury and the uorkers to find proOuctive emptoyment." One
obvious atternative to retief uouLd have been a tJ.S. programme of
subsidies to the domestic industry. Such an action, in addition to
being a distortion of our oHn market, t.toutd probab[y have been at [east
as harmfuI to our trading partnersr competitive positions as the reLief
the President granted.
Ihe rJ.S. special.ty steeI industry Lobbied vigorousIy for five years
of import reLief - the t.T.C. had recommended three years - at levets
much more restrictive than proposed by the 1.T.C. There uas significant
support in Congress for such strict reLief. The President, holever,
approved a retief package tor four years. Both the tariff and quota
portions of the remedy are degressive, that is, the tarifts decIine
and the quotas expend in the second, third and fourth years of reLief-
This degression rriLI be impIemented rhether or not recovery in the
domestic industry Proceeds.
The argument iS made that rrre Subject others to "doubte jeopar6y" by
imposing Section 201 reLief in addition to antidumping/countervaiting
duties. lie reject this argument. These remedies are taken under
different provisions of our statues (urhich paratIeI the GATT approach)
to address ditferent probtems. CountervaiLing and antidumping duties
are designed to neutrat ize the unfair advantages which foreign
governmeht Subsidization, or dumping by foreign firmsr gives overseas
suppLiers in our market. Section 201 rel.ief is designed to ston the
gro5th of injurious imports temporarity, so that domestic f irrts have
time to improve their prociuctivity." (1)
(1) Source: u.S- Mission to the European communities JuLy
tBackground on tJ.S. lmport Restrictions on SpeciaLity
1 983
SteeLs'
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16. ln three crisp paragraphs He can see atL el'ements of current tJ'S'
trade PoIicY:
anambiguousautomaticityregardingthedsstatutes
nhich are said to'para[teL the GATT approachr, but dO nOt;
fearofCongressorassumedfearofCongress',pushing
for something uorse"l
-theuseofthesubsidyissuetoturnfreetradetheory
, 
into poLiticat'Ly popu[ar protectionist poticy'
As att this came onty six neeks after the uitIiamsburg summit'
theEuropeansHerefurious.The'uniIateraIprotectionistmeaSuresI
as the E.c. described them uere undermining assurances to rhaIt
protectionism'.ThemeasureS,compl'ainedEurope,Herenot
accompanied by any coherent acijustment p[an; nhat uas more, the
protection given r.as rfar in excess of any injury al'teged'' Above aLt
the commission rejected the'doub[e ieopardy' in that both Section 201
protection glQ additionaL anti-dumping and countervaiLing duties nere
proposed. They criticised the imptied suggestion that 'unfair tracting
practicesbyiJ.S.'spartnerscansomehoujustitytheresortto
Art. XIX action'-
The Americans otf ered an ord:r[y trlarketing Arrangement simi [ar to
the Arrangement on carbon SteeLs. The community dectined on this
occasion to pay this version of 'cianege[d" They ciemanded consuttations
and compensations under the 6AIT'
vn uHSI-tE9S8Nl-UAI-EE-tgSENI-EBAE-IEE-EgtU9-!IEEt-NEgqMIlqN!?
a) Negetiegi!e-e9-Eelgpg
17. These n€gotiations uere difficutt because of the comptexity of
institr-rtionat retationships betreen companies, nat ionaI governments
and the commission, the state of crisis in the inciustry, and because the
impact of American pressures bore disproportionatel'y on some Member States'
tr,lith tro exceptions, the Member states shoued suitab[e sotidarity
throughoutthenegotiations.ltis,inoeed,arguabLetlrateventhe
sing[e attempt to arrange separate nat'ionat deaLs Has provoked by the
commission in order to demonstrate the tutitity of such gestures' By
the end of negotiations the reIevant British Minister cou[d publ'icat[y
rebut cau.s for an independent British move by reference to the
rcommunityrs greater clout in these mattersr. soLidarity paid off'
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Houever, the more cynicaL might perhaps detect a tJ'S' interest in
deaLing nith a unified Europe. The industry which the Americans
most feared nas that of Germany, against uhom no charges of subsidy
couLd at that stage be proved. The conc[usion of 'nationatr deats
uou[d have teft the American market open to German competition'
Sotidarity means [osses as HetI as gains, and the German Government
is entitled to praise for its sacrifice of nationa[ interests at a
key stage.
b) Nege!.ie!ine-l!!h-!he-9oi!ed-9!q!ee
1g. Certain conc[usions may be draun about negotiating uith any U'S'
Administration. obviousty no negotiatbn can be seen in isoLation'
one ,crisis, Links to another. Trigger Price ttechanism is succeeded by
Carbon Steet Arrangement, and that by uniLateraI action on speciat
steets. Crises have come in uaves and one might reasonab[y expect the
next in 1gg6 and 1g8g. A certain grand inevitabiLity marks the decay
of the traditiona[ steel. industry on both sides of the AtLantic'
TherecentsteeLcriseshavemadecLeartheprotectionist
potentiaL of the Trade Reform Act 1974 and the Trade Administration
Act 1979. It is not aLtogether out of Iine ntih previous American
behaviour that the domestic consequences of ratification of the Kennedy
and Tokyo rounds shoutd have previousLy undetected protectionist
potentiaL. The discussion on carbon steeI ras conducted, not in GATT
terms, but within the parameters of the rJnited States's oun tegistation'
Their definition of'subsidies't.as centraL to their oun case' The
negotiation uras in eftect conducted under duress, because the invocation
of GATT procedures'HOuLd have taken too Longt and the commerciaL forfeit
,rroutd have been too great.
lg.Thesheerconstitutiona[comptexityoftheAmericansideofthe
negotiations made the notoriousLy opaque European decision-making Iook
c[ear by comparison. Ihe interptay betueen the office of the tJ'S'
Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the InternationaI
TradecommissionrcongressandthePresidenthimsel'frasberildering'
Furthermore, part of this interp[ay rras judiciaI and part politicat'
The judicial aspect Lead to sudden [osses of porrer by the Administration
at cruciaI moments, such as after E August 19E2. The AdminiStration
and the European commission had reached an Arrangement, but it cou[d not
be concLuded rithout the permission of the rJ.s. steet industry'
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c) Dea!-iBs-rr!!-!!s-Eesgee-!du!o!g!sag!es
20. Europeans may have been surprised by the rather disagreeabte
combination of free-trade homiIies rith protectionist measures uhich
has markect the Reagan trade policy to date. Americans tend to respond
by pointing out hou much uorse,eatters could have been. lt uou[d seem
that in the U.S., as eLserh€re, continucd recession and the evaporation
of undoubted American superiority has [ed to an assertiveness in trade
matters. A generaI pubtic predisposition touards Protectionism, urith
deep historicaI roots, undoubtedLy exists. This can be converted by
certain groups into actuaI protectionist measures. The free trade
srpporters in the Adninietration rnay atlor their ideo[ogicaL objections
to protection to be srept aside if an e[ement of infringement of the
free market, such as state subsidizrtion, can be defionstrated. Thus
the President ras againat tfte T.P.li. as pfotectionist; nhi[e the
industfy uanted it broken beqause it ras not providing enough protection.
The combination of the
unbecoming greed by certain
stockpites and a ready-made
the President's attention to
rith its steeI industrYr.
deregutation of 'oiI country goodsr and an
European coapanies, ted to embarrassing
opportunity for the U.S. industry to drau
thc dc9rle to rhich rEurope rars in bed
?1. It has becn said that a'gCnt[eoan is never rude by accidentr.
The Japanese rould never havc acted rith'such accidentaL bad manners.
Perhaps in the current rorld poitcd hatf-uay betreen free trade and
managed trade, discretion is .tror€ irportant than aggression-
d) ls!g!diss-s0d-ths-!s!sre-e!-ghE-90II
??. ,subsidies, their detinitiort and control', is tfie gotden thread
rhich links ttre aspects of the recent steet crises. If GATT uiLt not
poLice and devetop its Code on Srrrbsidies then the system ritl' be
subverted at rany points. lt is your Rmporteurrs vier that untess the
GATT is radicaLl,y updated, exttnded and given increased porer to decide
on trade matt€rs, the future of the opcn trading system rnust be in doubt.
lf the current GATT arrangements cannot be nade to uork betreen the
ror[drs largest trading entities, Europe and America, it has scant
change of rorking e[seuhere. One shoutd be encouraged by the reference
of the SpeciaL Stee[s case to GATT but, at the time of uriting, aLt the
evidence routd seem tQ point to the usual $enario of deLay' As e[serhere
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in the Attantic retationship, responses to comnon ror[d probtems shon
themse[ves first as AtLantic probtems. Rather more than the tuture ot
our respective steeI industries is invotved in the resotution of such
disputes betueen America and Europe.
VIII. EEgutq-IEE8E.EE-9EINgEE-IN-IEE.EglESN!!!:g-gUN
YgtUUIAB!.8EgIBA!!I.8EB8UgEEE!IE?
23. The combination of a rmanitest crlsl,sr in the stcet industry ot
Europe and a restriction of exports to that industryrs Iargest singtc
externaI market have led to catts tor a tightening of the Communityrs
bitateraI arrangemetns rith its orn supp[iers of steet. [n fact, at no
time has the Comnunity resorted to the externaI quantitative restrictions
provided for in Art. 74 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. tt has chosen the path
of Votuntary Restraint Agreements uith its traditionaI partners and has
undertaken to respect the principLe of preserving the traditionaI
patterns of trade, due account being taken of the deveLopment of
i ts market.
?4. The present steet poticy of the Conmunity provides in the main tno
distinct and possibl.y comptcmentary mcchenisms rith uhich to achleve
the above objectives:
a) Eesig-Esjges
Estabtished in conformity rith the GATT anti-dumping code, these
are generaLty appLicab[e in the Community.'s retations rith third
countries. PubLished regutar[y since I January 1978 for most E.C.S.C.
iron and steeI products, basic prices on imports are ca[cutated by
reference to the louest normal costs in the supptying country or
countries uhere there are normal conditions of competition. ln the
event of the calcutation being contestod, an appea[ may be todged with
the Court of Justice of the European Conmunities. The basic prices
are subject to modification uhen the revier of the calculations of. normaI
costs in the supplying countries reveal a given [evet of increase. Such
adjustments of basic prices, expressed in ECUs, naturaLty take account
of any ftuctuations in exchang€ rates.
Basic prices are used as a rEterence tor the apptication of the
Community measures aimed at.deaIing rith dumping. ln the event, in
particu[ar, of the basfc prices being underquoted, the importer runs the
risk of setting in motion an anti-dumping procedure to uhich both the GATT
anti-dumping code measures and the existing Community provisions are appticab[e.
- 
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b) Ihe-gut!es-e!-assessgqto!s
Ihcn thc brsic prices rere introduccd, the Comunity uas suare of
thc incvitrbtc thrcat rhich this oyrtcn routd posc to the raintcnance
of thc trrditional, pettcrns of trrdci this night lead to a reduction
in supptice of productc fror thc countrles rhich had bccn Coneunityrs
tradltlonrt suppticrs. fo prcvcnt thic frot hrppcning, it rrs
dccldcd to otfcr . rort ttvourrblr r[trrnttlvt to thr rppticrtion
of btrlc prlces.
Conrcqucntl,y, rt thG ttld of 197t, the Comunlty invitcd thc
third countries rhich rcrc its rain tupptiers of stec[ ,to conctude rith
it bil,atcrr[ arrangcoents val,id for onG ycar rnd rctating t,o irports
into the Comunity of products originating in thcsc countries. Since
thcn, the lrrangcnGnts hrvc bccn rencaotiatcd and extlnded annuatty and
at prescnt govrrn retrtions betrccn thc Coanunity and 14 third countriesp
nurtye Austria, Fintcnd, llorray, Steden, Sprin, Brazit, Korea,
Aurtrctia, BuLgrrio, Hungtry, Potcnd, Rollnir rnd Czcchostovrkir; r
spcciat agreGrcnts crists rlth Jrprn.
It shoutd be obacrvrd thrt, in introducing thls ncchlnicn, thc
Gonnunity took clro to r!3ptct tht gtnOrrl lgrcrnrnt rclchrd ln thc
0ECD in 1977 rcgrrding th! nlGd to prcrlrvc trrdltlonrl patttrn3 ot
trrdc rnd to on3urt th.t r country dld not pt3r tht burdtn of its orn
crisls on to a ptrtner country. .
24. The dctail,s of such nechanisns are unctcar but their etfectiveness
cannot be doubtcd. The reccnt ensrcr to Partianentary Question 307/E3
shous that E.C. i@Orts tfor third cowrtrieS in retation to apparent
congumptionr rose trom 9.172 (Eur 9) in 1979 to only 9.E6U (Eur 9)
in 19E2. llo tightening up of Europers V.R.A.'s routd, therefore, seem
ncceSsary.
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ANNEX I
1. 19t3 UorLd tion rnd i s into thr US
Iortd production of nGr 3tcG[ uountcd to 664 niLl'ion tons in 1983 vhich is
+ Z.9l or 19 nriLtion tonl norc then ln 19E2. Yct 19E3rs 664 mit[ion tons is
6I nlLLlon ton3 thort of thc rccord 747 nll,l,ton tons rGlchcd tn 1979t r drop
of -11.1I.
prodrctlon {n thc lcrtcrn rortd ln 19E3 res 407 rnll,Lion tons rhlch is 2.1I
htghcr thm thr 39E nil,tion ton3 rGcordcd in 19E2. It stit[ renains 18.2I
or 19 rll,tlon tonr lomr thrn th! 497 rlLLlon tons producad in 1979.
Thc pr{nclpl,r changG rrs in thc Unitcd St.tG3 rhare 1983 rltncsscd a + 13.2I
or 9 nlLtlon tons rorG than thc 66 rtttion tonr produced in 19E2. Production
ln thc EEC doctlncd by -l.tl rnd in JlPan by -2.4I ln 19E3. These flgurcs
comc lftcr tn rlptdy cxtrorcty [Or Lgvcl of prOduction in 1982.
us rtcrt ltrportr nrl up to 2.4I ovcr [rst ycrr to t n!], [evc[ of imports at
ll nrll,l,ton tont. trportr crpturcd rbout onl-flfth of thc doncrtlo ntrkrt.
EEC,rhlilonts doctlnrd' 26.5I to 4.1 ntl,tlon tonr dur trrgrLy to thr rrrrngcment
nrgptltted bctrccn thl US end thc Coununity t '
Jrprn slntLerl,y rcduccd its ship;tnts to the US by 1t.3I to 4.2 nitlion tons.
Horevlr othcr countrles shippcd 51.lf of 1983 3tce[ ioports or 8.7 nriLtlon tons,
up to 46.3I from 5.9 mil'Lion tons ln 19E2.
Tho rtrongcst chatLcngc rt prescnt to thc Octobcr 19E2 Agrecmcnt tas announced
on 24 Jrnurry 19E4. On thrt drtG Blthtehcn Stcct Corporation rith the support
of thc Lhltcd Stcclrorkcrs of Arncricr rnnounccd that it had introduced a
rcq$rt to thr US Internrtional Tradc Conrmisslon under the 1974 Trade Act ask-
lng for rtL lnportr of clrbon ctcol to bc tinitcd to t totet 15U share of the
US mrkat md attcglng thrt doncstic industry htd bccn damaged by imports up
to nou. tilportt currentty rvcrtgc bctrccn 20I and 221 of a[[ stec[ used in the
US rlth EEC rrportl rccounting for Jurt over 5I of the US merket. Atthough
2. Bothl,chcrn Stcet and the nrl chal to thc carbon steeL egrcencnt
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Bethtehemrs request is ctearty contrary to the spirit of the EEC Arrangement
it uas not targeted specificaLLy at European producers. Bethtehem's stated
rationale for the trade suit ras the possibLe unfair trade practices of various
devel,oping countries, particul'arLy in Latin America' Horever, under Section 201
of the 1974 Trade Act rthe us is required to investigate atl imports rather
thantodistinguishbetrreenfairandunfairtrade.l
Bethtehem steet is nou essentialty cal,ting for rglobat quotast on stee[ imports
into the American market.
The finaL decision on uhether to irnpose neu quotas remains uith the President'
Under the 19E? Arrangement the EEC has the right to uni[ateratty renounce the
agreement shoutd new complaints over carbon steel imports be todged with the
ITC by us producer.s. To date, the comnission has beerr careful to avoid threats
of retaIiation.
3. SpeciaLitY SteeIs
In response to the US Limits on imports of speciality steel products, the
community has announced retaLiatory meesures upon a range of us imports to the
Community incLuding chemicaI products, sporting goods and security devices'
The Community has norl agraed the adninistrative detaiL of hou these retaIiatory
meesures are to uork uith the uS. It may therefore be said that the fuL[ pro-
cedure under GATT rutes has nou been corpleted'
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ANNEX II
l,toTIoN FoR A RESOLUTTON <OOCUlenr 1-954t81'
tabled by Mr de Ia I,IALENE, Mr ANSQUER, Mr CLEIIENT,
Mr COUSTE, llr CRONfN, Dtr DAVERN, Drr DELEAU, Mr DENIAU,
mrs EWING, tlr FANTON, llr FLANAGAN, ltr GERONI!,1I,
Mr ISRAEL, ltr rrUNOT, tlr LALOR, ltr litEO, Mr NYBORG,
!,lr PAULHAN, llr REMILLY, Mise de VALERA, ltr VIE and
!{rs WEISS
on behalf of the Group of European progressive
Democrats
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of procedure
on a European riposte to the complaint nade by
American attel conpanies
The European Parliament o '
- eoncerned et the large nunber of anti-dunping end antl-rubeidy corrplainta
Iodged againat the various Cotmunity lteel producerr on 12 Novcrnbbr 198i
by the leading US steel conpanies,
- noting that between 1979 and I98l European exports of steel to the UBA.fc11
by I5t, i.e. significantly nore than US steel lnports as a who1e,
I. Considera therefore that the claina of dauage levelled against
European steel producers are conpletely unfounded, particularly
in view of thc high levcl of profitc rccorded by the Amerlean
stcel companicU
2. Refers to its earlier rcaolutions (Docs. L-L9z/80 and r-s65/Bo)
condemning such practices, which rere edopted almoct unanimously;
3. supports therefore any action that may be taken by the cornnrunity
to prevent the traditionar patterns of trade betreen the EEC and
the usA from being eeriourly disrupted, uhich rould jeopardize thejobs of thoueanda of rcrkerg;
l. Rcgueste that, rhould cuch ection feil, conlidcration ghould bc aivcn
to countcr-mcrlurea by all thG l,tenber St.tGr acting together;
5. Ingtruct3 it! President to forrard thlr rcrolution to thc Council
and the Conunilrion.
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ANNEX III
iOTIOil FOR A RESOLUTIOil (DOCUTTENT 1-699t82\
trbLcd by f,r coLLtNs, llt oulil, llr ADAil,
tlr GRtttITHS, t{s GLHYO, tir R0GERS rnd tir KEY
purrurnt to RuLt 4? ol thG tutos of Procrdure
on thc rlturtlon in thc stcel lnfrrrtry
I!s-Egcee$o-e! illrg9n! r
A - Ararc that irnports into thc Europern Conaunlty fror thlrd countrlorhavc risrn ovcr recent nonths,
I - Concerned thrt the UK stecl lndustry h.t bcqn thc nost scrlousty
rffccted by such import3,
C - Avarc that thc uK stcel industry hrr rcduccd ltt crgacity morc thrn
rny othcr European Conmunity country,
D - Arare that in June of this yGrr r[onc, 3EI of stccl inports lnto thcUK cane fron non-EEC countrics such u floaanlr, south korcr,South Africe and Brazit,
l. requcsts the comnission to investigatc, 13 e ilattcr of urgGncy, raysin rhich greatcr protGction can be-providcd to the stoet lndusiryr-
espcciaIty thosc arGa3 rost sGvcrcl,y affcctcd by thlrd country imortr;
Z. derands that thG Coanission invcstigatcs norc fuu.y thc aLl,egettonrof incrcrscd rtcol ctprclty ln rrny-rcrbcr cq{rtrti3 rlncr li7'.
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